PROGRAM

SOCIETY for ECONOMIC DESIGN

Conference on Economic Design 2015
Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey  July 1-4, 2015
BRIEF PROGRAM

July 1, 2015
14:00 - 17:00: Conference Registration
17:00 - 18:30: SED Plenary Lecture
19:30 – 22:30: Welcome Reception at Pera Palace Hotel Jumeirah

July 2, 2015
09:00 - 11:00: Parallel Sessions
11:00 - 11:30: Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:45: Murat Sertel Plenary Lecture
12:45 - 14:00: Lunch & Meeting of the Editorial Board of the Review of Economic Design
14:00 - 16:00: Parallel Sessions
16:00 - 16:30: Coffee Break
16:30 - 18:00: Parallel Sessions

July 3, 2015
09:00 - 11:00: Parallel Sessions
11:00 - 11:30: Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:45: Paul Kleindorfer Plenary Lecture
12:45 - 14:00: Lunch & Board meeting of the Society for Economic Design
14:00 - 16:00: Parallel Sessions
16:00 - 16:30: Coffee Break
16:30 - 18:00: Parallel Sessions

July 4, 2015
09:00 - 11:00: Parallel Sessions
11:00 - 11:30: Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:45: Leo Hurwicz Plenary Lecture
12:45 - 14:00: Lunch
14:00 - 16:00: Parallel Sessions
16:00 - 16:30: Coffee Break
16:30 - 18:00: Parallel Sessions
19:30 – 23:00: Gala Dinner on boat along Bosphorus
The conference program comprises 4 Plenary Lectures and 66 contributed sessions, each involving 4 presentations.

The first plenary lecture is the SED lecture given by Charles Plott on July 1st at 17:00, which makes the transition between the Doctoral School in Experimental Economics (June 30- July 1) and the conference. All contributed sessions and the other plenary lectures will be held between July 2nd at 9:00 and July 4th at 18:30.

Participants can register at the conference desks from July 1st at 14:00. Please consult the website for information about how to get to Santral Campus.
Plenary Lectures

SED Lecture
Charles Plott (California Institute of Technology)

Design to influence voting groups in a world of only public goods:
Decentralized social choice and veto powers

Chair: Ayça Ebru Giritligil (İstanbul Bilgi University)
Place: Room 404, ÇSM Building

Murat Sertel Lecture
Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Information design

Chair: Semih Koray (Bilkent University)
Place: Room 404, ÇSM Building

Paul Kleindorfer Lecture
Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)

Scarf’s lemma and matching with complementarities

Chair: Hans Peters (Maastricht University)
Place: Room 404, ÇSM Building
Leo Hurwicz Lecture

Eric Maskin (Harvard University)

Elections and strategic voting: Condorcet and Borda

Chair: Walter Trockel (Bielefeld University and Istanbul Bilgi University)

Place: Room 404, ÇSM Building
Parallel Sessions: Overview

[Thursday, July 2]

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<td>Computational and Experimental Decision Making (Organized By Haake C. J.)</td>
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[Friday, July 3]

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<td>Choice 1</td>
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<td>Optimal Pricing and Auctions (Organized By Bergemann D.)</td>
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IMPORTANT

Please notice the following rules which should be respected without any exception!

• In each contributed session, the last speaker is the chairperson for all but the last presentation. For the last presentation, the session’s first presenter acts as chairperson.

• All contributed sessions start at full or half hours. Each presentation is 30-minute long. All presentations in contributed sessions, also in those few with only two or three presentations, have to be strictly stopped after 25 minutes by the chairpersons. The remaining 5 minutes are left for discussions or left free.

• It follows that if a session contains less than four presentations, it should end after 90 minutes. The remaining time cannot be used either for extending the length of presentations/discussions, or another unscheduled presentation.
## Parallel Sessions July 2 (9:00 -11:00)

### Aggregation and Disaggregation  
Room 401, ÇSM Building

- Bedrosian G. (Bielefeld University)  
  *Microeconomic Foundations of Representative Agent Models By Means of Ultraproducts*

- Börgers T. (University of Michigan)  
  *Reformulation of the Axiomatic Foundations of Relative Utilitarianism*

- Maraun N. (University of Paderborn)  
  *Disaggregating Consumer Evaluations*

- Nebioğlu D. (İstanbul Bilgi University)  
  *Wealth Effects and Labour Supply: An Experimental Study*

### Allocations 1  
Room 204, ÇSM Building

- Ko C.Y. (National University of Singapore)  
  *Division of a Resource in a Grid Network*

- Saral A.S. (University of Trento)  
  *An Agent-based Model of Open-Source Software Development*

- Ertemel S. (İstanbul Technical University)  
  *Ex-ante versus Ex-post Proportional Rules for State Contingent Claims*

- Xue J. (Singapore Management University)  
  *Claim uncertainty and egalitarian division with wastage*

### Auctions 1  
Room 402, ÇSM Building

- Segev E. (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)  
  *Sequential Bidding in Asymmetric First Price Auctions*

- Yang Z. (University of York)  
  *An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders*

- Derbyshire D. (University of Birmingham)  
  *Sequential Equilibrium and Moral Hazard Auctions*

- Delnoij J. (Utrecht University)  
  *Competing First Price and Second Price Auctions*
### Game Theory 1

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| • Duman P. (Istanbul Bilgi University)  
*An Exact Non-Cooperative Foundation for Nash Solution* |
| • Yamamura H. (Tokyo Institute of Technology)  
*A Simple and Dynamically Stable Nash Mechanism for the Division Problem with Single-dipped Preferences* |
| • Chakrabarti S. (Queen's University)  
*Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations* |
| • Mc Quillin M. (University of East Anglia)  
*Backward Induction Foundation for the Shapley Value* |

### Matching 1

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| • Akahoshi T. (Waseda University)  
*Acyclicity and the Self-Contained Expectation of the Core In Matching Problems* |
| • Ehlers L. (University of Montreal)  
*Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics* |
| • Tumennasan N. (Aarhus University)  
*Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism* |

### Information

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| • Brandts J. (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)  
*Supply Function Competition, Market Power, And the Winner’s Curse: A Laboratory Study* |
| • Ngangoué K. (DIW Berlin)  
*Learning From Unrealized Versus Realized Prices* |
| • Geiger M. (University of Innsbruck)  
*Coordination Risk, Correlated Fundamental States, and Government Bond Yields in Currency Unions* |
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<td>• Johnen J. (European School of Management and Technology)</td>
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<td>Congestion Pricing: A Mechanism Design Approach</td>
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<td>• Messner M. (Bocconi University, IGIER and CESifo)</td>
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<td>Selling to the Mean and the Variance</td>
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<td>• Paulsen P. (Technical University of Munich)</td>
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<td>First-Price Package Auctions in a Principal-Agent Environment</td>
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Parallel Sessions July 2 (14:00-16:00)

**Auctions 2**  
Room 401, ÇSM Building

- Boudreau J.W. (University of Texas-Pan American, Department of Economics and Finance)  
  *A Note on Noisy Vs. Standard All-Pay Auctions*

- Carlson J.I. (Lund University)  
  *An Approximative Auction for When Bidders Have Non-Quasi-Linear Preferences*

- Fugger N. (University of Cologne)  
  *Trust in Procurement Interactions*

- Gillen P. (University of Cologne)  
  *Pre-Auction or Post-Auction Qualification?*

**Bargaining**  
Room 202, ÇSM Building

- Karagözoğlu E. (Bilkent University)  
  *Between Anchors and Aspirations: A (New) Family of Bargaining Solutions*

- Lang X. (Tilburg University)  
  *On the Impossibility of Non-Constant Divisions in Bargaining with Correlated Types*

- Hwang I. (University of Miami)  
  *Transparency of Outside Options in Bargaining*

- Eraslan H. (Rice University)  
  *Coalitional Bargaining*

**Aggregation and Welfare**  
Room 402, ÇSM Building

- Østerdal L.P. (University of Southern Denmark)  
  *First Order Dominance: Characterization and Two Checking Algorithms for the Bivariate Case*

- Herzberg F. (Bielefeld University)  
  *Respect for Experts or Respect for Unanimity? The Liberal Paradox in Probabilistic Opinion Pooling*

- Schoch D. (Nottingham University)  
  *Game Form Representation for Judgement and Arrovian Aggregation*

- Zwicker W. (Union College)  
  *Aggregation of Binary Evaluations: A Borda-like Approach*
Mechanism Design 2
Room 201, ÇSM Building

- Quadir A. (Osaka University)
  Mechanism Design in Single Dimensional Type Spaces

- Krämer F. (LMU Munich)
  Delegating Pricing Power to Buyers: An Experimental Investigation

- Juarez R. (University of Hawaii)
  Implementing Efficient Allocations in Bilateral Networks

- Sharma T. (ITAM)
  Money-Back Guarantees

Behavioral Game Theory
Room 204, ÇSM Building

- Neugebauer T. (University of Luxembourg)
  Taming Selten’s Horse by Impulse Matching

- Smith J. (Rutgers University)
  Cognitive load and mixed strategies

- Nagel R. (ICREA & Pompeu Fabra University & BGSE)
  De-framing Rules to De-anchor Beliefs in Beauty Contest Experiments: Keynesian Level-k vs. Keynesian Sentiments

- Meloso D. (Rennes School of Business)
  The Mechanics of Reputational Cheap Talk: An Experiment with Crystal Balls

Group Identification
Room 205, ÇSM Building

- Çağlayan D. (İstanbul Bilgi University)
  In-Group Favoritism vs. Social Efficiency Concerns

- Tapkı G.İ. (Kadir Has University)
  Two Simple Characterizations of the Liberal Rule Based On Consistency Requirement

- Krupka E. (University of Michigan)
  Mirror on the Network: Peer Selection and Endogenous Preferences

- Ju B.G. (Seoul National University)
  Multinary Group Identification
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<td>Consecutive moral decision-making: evidence from an economic experiment</td>
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<td>Cord-Landwehr A. (University of Paderborn)</td>
<td>Network Creation Games: Think Global - Act Local</td>
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<td>Drees M. (University of Paderborn)</td>
<td>Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games</td>
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<td>Skopalik A. (University of Paderborn)</td>
<td>Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games</td>
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# Parallel Sessions July 2 (16:30-18:00)

## Implementation

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| **Azacis H.** (Cardiff University)  
Revised Implementation |
| **Dalkiran A.** (Bilkent University)  
Epsilon-Ex Post Implementation |
| **Lopez H.** (University of Maryland)  
Practical Implementation of a Traffic Congestion System |

## Auctions 3

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| **Bobkova N.** (University of Bonn)  
First Price Auction with Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Bidders |
| **Boscan L.** (Copenhagen Business School)  
The Reverse Product-Mix Auction and Further Extensions |
| **Di Corato L.** (Uppsala University)  
Procurement Auctions for Conservation Contracts with Embedded Real Options |

## Information and Voting

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| **Bozbay I.** (University of Surrey)  
A Bayesian Voting Model with Multiple Issues |
| **Elbittar A.** (Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE))  
Ignorance and Bias in Collective Decisions |
| **Xefteris D.** (University of Cyprus)  
Imperfectly informed voters and Strategic Extremism |
### Finance and Markets  
**Room 205, ÇSM Building**

- Bosch-Doménech A. (Berlin University of Technology)  
  *Cognitive Bubbles*

- Jain N. (City University London)  
  *Financing and Mode of Entry in Foreign Markets*

- Rossini G. (University of Bologna)  
  *Vertical Flexibility, Outsourcing and the Financial Choices of the Firm*

### Political Economy 1  
**Room 204, ÇSM Building**

- Cobo Reyes R. (University of Exeter Business School)  
  *The Effect of Charitable Giving On Workers’ Performance: Experimental Evidence*

- Djawadi B. (University of Paderborn)  
  *Know your whistleblowers: What personality can tell you about who will blow the whistle- Insights from an economic experiment*

- Leventoğlu B. (Duke University)  
  *Born Weak, Growing Strong: The Life Cycle of Rebel Organizations and Civil Wars Duration*

### Oligopolistic Games  
**Room 402, ÇSM Building**

- Wiseman T. (University of Texas at Austin)  
  *When does predation dominate collusion?*

- Georgantzis N. (University of Reading)  
  *Equilibrium in Catalogue Competition: Theory and Experimental Evidence*

- Haake C.J. (University of Paderborn)  
  *Strategic Formation of Customer relationship Networks*
• Gitmez A.A. (MIT)
  Student Exchange with Partial Fairness

• Phan W. (University of Rochester)
  Efficiency, Strategy-Proofness, and the Partial-Endowment Lower Bound in the Object Re-Allocation Problem

• Kesten O. (Carnegie Mellon University)
  Curse of Stability: The Appeals round of the NYC High School Match
# Parallel Sessions, July 3 (9:00-11:00)

## Transferable Utility Games  
**Room 201, ÇSM Building**

- Derya A. (Bilkent University)  
  *A Characterization of the Myerson Value*

- Doğan E. (HSE Moscow)  
  *An Egalitarian Solution to Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems*

- Koray S. (Bilkent University)  
  *Every Member of the Core is as Respectful as Any Other*

- Gomez J.C. (University of Washington, Bothell)  
  *An Aspiration Core Convergence Theorem*

## Allocations 2  
**Room 203, ÇSM Building**

- Büyükboyacı M. (METU)  
  *The Effect of Bankruptcy Rules on Investment Behavior: An Experimental Test*

- Flanagan F.X. (Wake Forest University)  
  *Group Housing Allocation: Collusion, Fairness and Efficiency*

- Rastegari B. (University of Glasgow)  
  *Pareto Optimality in the Many-to-Many House Allocation Problem with Indifference*

- Thomson W. (University of Rochester)  
  *On The Water Allocation Problem*

## Strategic Communication  
**Room 401, ÇSM Building**

- Gesche T. (University of Zurich)  
  *Debiasing Strategic Communication?*

- Özyurt S. (Sabancı University)  
  *A Fraudulent Expert and Short-Lived Customers*

- Yıldırım M. (Melikşah University)  
  *Pre-Contest Communication Incentives*

- Wang R. (University of Edinburgh)  
  *Correlated Information Games*
### Interaction in Networks

- Kovari J. (University of the Basque Country)
  *(Anti-) Coordination and Equilibrium Selection in Networks*

- Kvasow D. (University of Adelaide)
  *From Sabotage Games to Border Protection*

- Kumar R. (Queen's University Belfast)
  *Resource Allocation in a Network*

- Bolton G. (University of Texas in Dallas)
  *Inflated Reputations: Leniency and Moral Wiggle Room in Trader Feedback Systems*

### Matching 3

- Hoyer B. (University of Paderborn)
  *Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents in a University Clearinghouse*

- Huesmann K. (University of Cologne)
  *Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns*

- Kotowski M. (Harvard University)
  *Multi-period Matching*

- Morimoto S. (Kobe University)
  *Strategy-proofness, Efficiency, and the Core in Matching Problems with Transfers*

### Political Economy 2

- Rebiere T. (Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris)
  *How Many Educated Workers Do You Wish for Your Economy? European Targets, Optimal Public Spending, and Labor Market Impact*

- Turley T. (Brigham Young University)
  *You Get What You Deserve: Experimental Evidence on Redistribution Preferences in China, Paraguay and Uganda*

- Yıldırım H. (Duke University)
  *“Giving” in to Social Pressure*

- Weymark J.A. (Vanderbilt University)
  *Voting Over Selfishly Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Schedules*
Mechanism Design 3 (Organized By Weymark J.A. & Sen A.)

Room 202, ÇSM Building

- Mierendorff K. (University College London)
  *Auctions with Limited Commitment*

- Mishra D. (Indian Statistical Institute)
  *Local Incentive Compatibility with Transfers*

- Ruckert D. (University of Cologne)
  *Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences*

- Anbarci N. (Deakin University)
  *Designing Fair Tiebreak Mechanisms the Case of Fifa Penalty Shootouts*
### Parallel Sessions, July 3 (14:00-16:00)

#### Assignments 1  
**Room 201, ÇSM Building**

- Atay A. (University of Barcelona)  
  *Generalized Three-Sided Assignment Markets Consistency and Core*

- Nesterov A.S (WZB, Berlin)  
  *Fairness and Efficiency in a Random Assignment: Three Impossibility Results*

- Robles F. (University of Barcelona)  
  *One-Seller Assignment Markets with Multi-Unit Demands: Core and Competitive Equilibrium*

- Alkan A. (Sabancı University)  
  *Pairing Games And Markets*

#### Auctions 4  
**Room 202, ÇSM Building**

- Mass H. (University of Cologne)  
  *The Limits of Non-discriminatory Mechanisms in Procurement*

- Kasberger B. (University of Vienna)  
  *On the Clock of the Combinatorial Clock Auction*

#### Allocations 3  
**Room 203, ÇSM Building**

- Kazumura T. (Osaka University)  
  *Anonymous Mechanism for Object Allocation without Quasilinearity*

- Klamler C. (University of Graz)  
  *Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items*

- Akyol E. (TOBB-ETU)  
  *Welfare Comparison of Allocation Mechanisms under Incomplete Information*

- Szwagrzak K. (University of Southern Denmark)  
  *Priority Classes And Weighted Constrained Equal Awards Rules For The Claims Problem*
Matching 4  
Room 204, ÇSM Building

- Arnosti N. (Stanford University)  
  *Shortlists in Centralized Clearing Houses*

- Gudmundsson J. (Lund University)  
  *Sequences in Pairing Problems*

- Papai S. (Concordia University)  
  *Reasonably and Securely Stable Matching*

- Park J. (Yonsei University)  
  *Competitive Equilibrium and Singleton Cores in Generalized Matching Problems*

Queuing  
Room 401, ÇSM Building

- Kayı Ç. (Del Rosario University)  
  *Queuing Problems with Exit Option*

- Onderstal S. (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute)  
  *Trading Places: An Experimental Comparison of Reallocation Mechanisms for Priority Queuing*

- Breinhjerg J. N. (University of Southern Denmark)  
  *Strategic Behavior and Social Outcomes in a Bottleneck Queue: Experimental Evidence*

- Sürücü O. (Bielefeld University)  
  *The Impact Of Time Pressure: Insights From A Queuing Experiment*

Political Economy 3  
Room 205, ÇSM Building

- İriş D. (Sogang University)  
  *Loss-Aversion in International Environmental Agreements*

- Cialowicz B. (Cracow University of Economics)  
  *Axiomatic Analysis of innovative Changes in a Consumer Sphere of the Arrow-Debreu Economy - A Schumpeterian Approach*

- Lipieta A. (Cracow University of Economics)  
  *Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms of Schumpeterian Evolution*

- Schmidt F. (University of Mainz)  
  *Reactivating the Long-Term Unemployed More Effectively: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Field Study*
**Voting Games**  
*Room 402, ÇSM Building*

- Basteck C. (Technical University of Berlin)  
  *The Borda Count and Dominance Solvable Voting Games*

- Courtin S. (University Cergy-Pontoise)  
  *Dichotomous multi-type games: Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf-Coleman power indices*

- Nganmeni Z. (THEMA, University Cergy-Pontoise)  
  *The Owen and Shapley Spatial Power Indices: A Comparison and a Generalization*

- Nikram E. (University of Exeter)  
  *A generalized Hoteling-Downs model with Incumbents*

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**Allocation of Indivisible Goods**  
*(Organized By Andersson T.)*  
*Room 404, ÇSM Building*

- Erlanson A. (University of Bonn)  
  *Allocating divisible and indivisible resources according to conflicting claims: collectively rational solutions*

- Serizawa S. (Osaka University)  
  *When are Strategy-Proof And Efficient Rules Possible In Objects Allocation With Money?*

- Velez R. A. (Texas A&M University)  
  *Perfect full implementation: a robust, simple, fair, and natural alternative*

- Andersson T. (Lund University)  
  *Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach*
**Parallel Sessions, July 3 (16:30-18:00)**

### Assignments 2  
**Room 203, ÇSM Building**

- Troyan P. (University of Virginia)  
  *Improving Welfare in Assignment Problems: an Experimental Investigation*
- Hafahr İ. (Carnegie Mellon University)  
  *Welfare-Maximizing Assignment of Agents to Hierarchical Positions*
- Kratz J. (Lund University)  
  *Overlapping Multiple Assignments*

### Contests  
**Room 205, ÇSM Building**

- Kirysheva I. (European University Institute)  
  *Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests with Sabotage*
- Olszewski W. (Northwestern University)  
  *Effort-Maximizing Contests*
- Chen Z. (London School of Economics)  
  *Spying in Contests*

### Political Economy 4  
**Room 401, ÇSM Building**

- Gönültaş S. (Doğuş University)  
  *Effects of Government Policies on Location Choice of a MNC between Asymmetric Countries*
- Sayag R.S. (Pompeu Fabra University and GSE)  
  *Conservative Decisions and Career Concerns*
- Rohde K. (Erasmus University Rotterdam)  
  *Positional Concerns Revisited – Revealing Two Sides of the coin*
School Choice 1
Room 204, ÇSM Building

- Hakimov R. (Berlin Social Sciences Center)
The Equitable Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for School Choice
- Heo E.J. (Vanderbilt University)
Kidney Exchange with Immunosuppressants
- Barlo M. (Sabancı University)
Sticky Matching in School Choice

Strategy-Proofness 1
Room 402, ÇSM Building

- Zeng H. (Singapore Management University)
Local Strategy-Proofness Revisited
- Long Y. (University of Glasgow)
Dynamic VCG Mechanisms in Queuing
- Chun Y. (Seoul National University)
Welfare Lower Bounds and Strategyproofness in the Queueing Problem

Market Design
Room 201, ÇSM Building

- Wang C. (Harvard University)
Market Design for Social Preferences
- Ünver U. (Boston College)
Lung Exchange
- Citanna A. (Yeshiva University)
Designing Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk and Equity (Organized By Fleurbaey M.)</th>
<th>Room 202, ÇSM Building</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Miyagishima K. (Waseda University)</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Fair Social Orderings over Allocations of Risky Prospects</em></td>
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<td>• Zuber S. (Paris 1 University and CNRS)</td>
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<td><em>Fair Intergenerational Decision Making: Ex Ante and Ex Post Approaches</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Fleurbaey M. (Princeton University)</td>
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<td><em>Long-term Discounting: Max or Min</em></td>
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Parallel Sessions, July 4 (9:00-11:00)

### Choice 1

**Room 201, ÇSM Building**

- Masatlıoğlu Y. (University of Michigan)  
  *A Random Attention Model*
- Ülkü L. (Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico)  
  *Stochastic Complementarity*
- Kıbrıs Ö. (Sabancı University)  
  *Limited Attention and Status Quo Bias*

### Contracts 1

**Room 203, ÇSM Building**

- Campioni E. (University of Roma II, Tor Vergata)  
  *Multiple Principle Multiple Agent Games with Exclusive Competition*
- Schlegel J.C (University of Lausanne)  
  *Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result*
- Bejan C. (University of Washington, Bothell)  
  *Performance-Based Contracts, Monitoring and Fraud*

### Fairness, Allocation, Costs

**Room 401, ÇSM Building**

- Raghavan M. (Indian Statistical Institute)  
  *Fair Allocation with Exact Capacity Constraints*
- Zheng M. (University of Macau)  
  *Distributive Justice and the Threshold Level of Resource in the Fair Resource Allocation*
- Hougaard J. L. (University of Copenhagen)  
  *Sharing the Cost of Risky Projects*
- García A.S. (University of Granada)  
  *Fairness in Tax Compliance: A Political Competition Model*
Strategy-Proofness 2

- Tierney R. (University of Rochester)
  *Dense Manipulability of Efficient and Voluntary Exchange Rules*

- Öztürk M. (MEF University, Istanbul)
  *On the Location of Public Bads: Strategy-Proofness under Two-Dimensional Single-Dipped Preferences*

- Zhou Y. (Osaka University)
  *Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Common Object Ranking Preferences*

Reputation and Leadership

- Brangewitz S. (University of Paderborn)
  *Quality Choices and Reputation Systems in Online Markets – An Experimental Study*

- Doğan G. (University of Cologne)
  *Leaders, Followers, and Group Decision-Making*

- Kubilay E. (Koç University)
  *Leadership and Group Decision-Making under Risk: Evidence from Children*

- Oljemark E. (University of Konstanz)
  *Reputation and the Value of Information in a Trust Game*

Social Choice 1 (Organized By Peters H.)

- Alcalde-Unzu, J. (University of Navarra)
  *Strategy-Proof Location of Public Facilities*

- Can B. (Maastricht University)
  *How To Compare Orders, Rankings, Queues, Lists?*

- Storcken T. (Maastricht University)
  *A Monotonicity Condition for Preference Correspondences*

- Peters H. (Maastricht University)
  *Choosing k from m: Feasible Elimination Procedures Reconsidered*
Parallel Sessions, July 4 (14:00-16:00)

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<td>• Karakaya M. (İzmir Katip Çelebi University)</td>
<td>Hedonic Coalition Formation Games with Variable Populations: Core Characterizations and (Im) Possibilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lazarova E. (University of East Anglia)</td>
<td>Inducing Stability in Hedonic Games</td>
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<td>• İnal H. (İzmir University)</td>
<td>Existence of a Unique Core in Coalition Formation Games</td>
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<td>• Siegenthaler S. (New York University Abu Dhabi)</td>
<td>Gradual Coalition Formation with Externalities</td>
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<tr>
<th>Social Interaction</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Exadaktylos F. (Middlesex University London)</td>
<td>Civic Attitudes, Social Capital and Institutions: a multi-level analysis across 47 European countries</td>
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<td>• Hilleringmann V. (University of Paderborn)</td>
<td>Corruption in the Physician-Patient Relationship – The Influence of Reciprocity</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Erol S. (University of Pennsylvania)</td>
<td>Network formation and Systemic Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bjerre-Nielsen A. (University of Copenhagen)</td>
<td>Centrality, stratification and adverse effects: network formation with value heterogeneity</td>
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### Social Choice and Voting

**Room 402, ÇSM Building**

- Dindar H. (İstanbul Bilgi University)
  *Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy*

- Jeong H. (Seoul National University)
  *Resolve Majority Rules*

- Chen Y. (Johns Hopkins University)
  *Dynamic Agenda Setting*

- Sarpca S. (Koç University)
  *Majority Choice of an Income Targeted Educational Voucher*

### School Choice 2

**Room 203, ÇSM Building**

- Jaramillo P. (University of Los Andes)
  *Transparency in School Choice*

- Chen L. (Université libre de Bruxelles)
  *Self-Selection in School Choice: Theory and Evidence from Mexico City High School Match*

- Kurino M. (University of Tsukuba)
  *College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized*

- Van der Linden M. (Vanderbilt University)
  *A New Method to Compare Manipulable Mechanisms, with Applications to School Choice*

### Matching and Contracts

**Room 204, ÇSM Building**

- Alva S. (University of Texas at San Antonio)
  *Pairwise Stability and Complementarity in Matching With Contracts*

- Afacan M. O. (Sabancı University)
  *Graduate Admission with Financial Support*

- Turhan B. (Boston College)
  *Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets with Contracts: Theory and Applications*

- Westkamp A. (Maastricht University)
  *Strategy-Proofness and Stability for Matching with Contracts*
Game Theory 2 (Organized By Peters H.)

- Keskin K. (Bilkent University)
  *Organizational Refinements of Nash Equilibrium*

- Schröder M. (Maastricht University)
  *Waiting in the Queue on Hotelling’s Main Street*

- Vermeulen D. (Maastricht University)
  *On Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Price-Quantity Games*

- Zseleva A. (Maastricht University)
  *Optimal Finitely Additive Strategies in Zero-Sum Games*
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<th>Optimal Pricing and Auctions</th>
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<tr>
<td>•  Lamba R. (Cambridge University)</td>
<td>Efficiency with(out) Intermediation in Repeated Bargaining</td>
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<tr>
<td>•  Baisa B. (Amherst College)</td>
<td>A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•  Farinha Luz V. (EUI and University of British Columbia)</td>
<td>Robust dynamic pricing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Parallel Sessions, July 4 (16:30-18:00)

#### Risk and Uncertainty

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<tr>
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</table>
| Omrane W.B. (Goodman School of Business at Brock University)  
*Exchange Rate Volatility Response to Macroeconomic news during Economic Expansions and Recessions* |
| Shafer R.C. (University of Illinois)  
*The Axiom of Symmetry and Failure of Convergence to Price-Taking under Knightian Uncertainty* |

#### Contracts 2

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<tr>
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</table>
| Gretschko V. (University of Cologne)  
*Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-) Negotiation* |
| Koçkesen L. (Koç University)  
*Optimal Delegation of Sequential Decisions: The Role of Communication and Reputation* |
| Montinari N. (University of Lund)  
*Back Scratching in Hierarchical Organizations* |

#### Choice 2

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Room 402, ÇSM Building</th>
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</table>
| Çuhadaroğlu T. (University of St. Andrews)  
*Choosing on Influence* |
| Kübler D. (Social Science Research Center Berlin & Technical University Berlin)  
*Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evidence* |
| Güney B. (Özyeğin University)  
*Choice with Switching Costs* |
### Mechanism Design 4  
Room 203, ÇSM Building

- Csőka E. (University of Warwick)  
  *Efficient Teamwork*
- Herbst H. (University of Bonn)  
  *Pricing Heterogeneous Goods under Ex Post Private Information*
- Howard J. V. (London School of Economics)  
  *Exchanging Goods Using Valuable Money*

### Matching 5  
Room 201, ÇSM Building

- Heller C. P. (Humboldt University)  
  *Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labour Market for Lawyers*
- Smilgins A. (University of Copenhagen)  
  *Two-Sided Matching with Objects*
- Zhu M. (GATE)  
  *Experience Transmission: Truth-telling Adoption in Matching*

### School Assignment  
Room 202, ÇSM Building

- Aygün O. (Boğaziçi University)  
  *College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case*
- Hammond R.G. (North Carolina State University)  
  *Identifying Sincere and Sophisticated Students in School Assignment: Direct Evidence from Application Data*
- Dur U. (North Carolina State University)  
  *Flexible Top Trading Cycles and Chains Mechanism: Maintaining Diversity in Erasmus Student Exchange*
• Masso J. (Universitat Autonoms de Barcelona)
  *On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness*

• You J.S. (California State University, East Bay, Hayward, CA)
  *Efficient and Budget-Balanced Assignment with Single-Peaked Preferences*
In its original incarnation, before restoration and conversion into Bilgi University Santral Campus, the Silahtaraga Power Plant was the Ottoman Empire’s first urban-scale power plant. The facility went into service on the Golden Horn, Istanbul’s oldest industrial area, in 1911 and supplied the city with electricity up until 1983. Today, the power plant stands as a unique industrial heritage site following its conversion into Santral Campus, a project which involved the collaboration of public sector, private sector and non-governmental organizations alike. Opening its doors on 8 September 2007, Santral Campus is one the most exhaustive conversion projects to be carried out in Turkey in the field of arts and culture.

Santral Campus has hosted over 20 national and international exhibitions since opening. Together, these exhibitions have attracted more than 500,000 visitors. In addition, Santral Campus has welcomed numerous leading international artists and thinkers for various events.

Santral campus is easily accessible by taxi and public buses. The conference building is named ÇSM. On Santral campus, this is the big building contiguous to the old electric plant. You will easily find the ÇSM building by looking at the outdoor signage displayed on the main campus square. The registration desk is at the entrance of the building. Throughout the conference, our staff is available to guide you and to answer your question, either at the desk or at the conference Office (4th floor).
CONFERENCE SHUTTLES

Conference shuttles are operating from July 1st to July 4th.

On July 1st, shuttles to Santral campus will operate from the Pera district and from the Golden Horn district at 14:00, 15:00, and 16:00. Shuttles are also organized from Santral campus to Pera Palace for the welcome reception. Departure from Santral campus at 19:00. Pera Palace is at a short walking distance to all conference hotels in the Pera district. For people staying in the Golden Horn district, a shuttle will depart from Pera Palace at the end of the reception.

On July 2nd and July 3rd, shuttles operate according to the timetable below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>July 2 and July 3</th>
<th>Morning</th>
<th>Afternoon</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERA DISTRICT</strong></td>
<td>Departure at 8:15</td>
<td>Departure at 18:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Round trip until 9:15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOLDEN HORN DISTRICT</strong></td>
<td>Departure at 8:30</td>
<td>Departure at 18:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Round trip until 9:30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Throughout the day, regular shuttles operated by Istanbul Bilgi University are available. They commute between Santral campus and KABATAŞ (please check on the windscreen). You can find shuttle hours at [http://www.bilgi.edu.tr/en/university/transportation/shuttle/?transportation-menu](http://www.bilgi.edu.tr/en/university/transportation/shuttle/?transportation-menu). From KABATAŞ, you can access Taksim square by funicular. Taksim square is at a walking distance to the Pera district. Taxis are also available. Just outside of campus, city buses also commute between Santral and Taksim or the Golden Horn shore. Please contact our staff for more information. In case of major problem, please contact Koray Özkan (+90 (0) 5324356848) or Jean Laine (+90 (0) 5306408799).
On July 4th, the shuttle timetable is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>July 4</th>
<th>Morning</th>
<th>Evening</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERA DISTRICT</td>
<td>Departure at 8:15</td>
<td>Departure from the boat peer at 23:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Round trip until 9:15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOLDEN HORN DISTRICT</td>
<td>Departure at 8:30</td>
<td>Departure from the boat peer at 23:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Round trip until 9:30</td>
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</table>

We will join the boat peer by boat departing from Santral campus at 18:45. Before seeing the Bosphorus by night, we will enjoy the Golden Horn.

The shuttle pick up and drop off points are located as follows

**PERA DISTRICT:** Opposite of the bottom of staircase along the Pera Palace. Signs are visible at the bottom of the staircase. Please go down to your left to the traffic light and cross.

**GOLDEN HORN DISTRICT:** Entrance of the Hilton Garden Inn Istanbul Golden Horn, which is at a short walking distance of all the conference hotels in this area.

**SANTRAL CAMPUS:** Main square

**SESSION ROOMS**

All sessions and plenary lectures take place in the ÇSM building. Plenary lectures are given in room 404 (3rd floor). Parallel sessions are held on the first floor (rooms 201, 202, 203, 204, 205), and on the third floor (rooms 401, 402). The conference office is on the fourth floor (room 501). All rooms are equipped with video/audio facilities and a white board. Please contact the desk in case you need a special equipment. Before each session, a student will be at the room door, and will intervene in case of technical problem.

**LUNCHES AND COFFEE BREAKS**

Lunches are served in the Papaz building, which is an old storage construction just besides the ÇSM building. Again, please follow the signage. Coffee, Turkish tea and cold beverages will be served at the entrance of the ÇSM building (near the registration desk), and on the 1st and the 3rd floors.
The **Welcome Reception** (July 1st, 19:30) is organized in the oldest European hotel. Built in 1892 for the purpose of hosting the Orient Express travelers. While contemplating a unique view on the Golden Horn, we hope you will enjoy the timeless and unique elegance, as did in the past prestigious guests, among them King Georges V, Tsar Nicolas II, Emperor Franz Joseph I, and also Mata Hari, Greta Garbo, Joséphine Baker, Alfred Hitchcock, and Agatha Christie, who wrote in room 411 her famous 1934 novel *Murder on the Orient Express*. More information on the Pera Palace can be found by following the links below:


Shuttle facilities are organized from Santral Campus to the Pera Palace (after the SED Plenary Lecture), and from Pera Palace to the Golden Horn hotel area at the end of the reception.

The **Gala Dinner** will be on a luxury boat cruising all evening long on the Bosphorus. Passengers will all waveless evening long benefit from the extraordinary sceneries on both European and Asian sides. Please do not forget your cameras. Further information about the boat can be found at:


Transportation is ensured from Santral Campus to the peer and back to the hotel areas.
Since its foundation, BİLGİ has attempted to establish a cultural and scientific community that promotes tolerance and respect for a diversity of individuals with different lifestyles, beliefs and ways of thinking within the framework of contemporary universal values, while at the same time maintaining strong ties with all segments of the society. BİLGİ community includes more than students; it also includes faculty, alumni, families, employers and neighboring communities where BİLGİ is located.

Being part of Laureate International Universities Network, the founding premise of BİLGİ has become ‘to make education more accessible and affordable so that more students can pursue their dreams’. BİLGİ seeks to educate free-thinking, creative, intellectually curious and enterprising individuals who will contribute to a world in which knowledge is accessible to all and, indeed, in which access to it has come to be seen as a fundamental human right. BİLGİ holds a primary responsibility for providing, maintaining and further developing an academic environment in which both students and faculty members are able to engage in learning and the production of knowledge at the highest level.

Students benefit from the advantages of studying at BİLGİ throughout and after their studies with 45 undergraduate and over 30 graduate programs and 15 vocational schools. Students at BİLGİ:

• can have a true international experience thanks to the Laureate International Universities Network membership,
• can study, obtain a double degree or continue their studies at undergraduate or graduate program levels at over 60 institutions in 27 countries,
• take part in social responsibility projects,
• work at non-governmental organizations,
• actively join the works of around 20 research centers and develop projects,
• participate in over 400 scientific and cultural activities every year at award-winning campuses located in the heart of the city.

İstanbul Bilgi University offers its students a true university experience. Students at BİLGİ not only prepare for their professional business lives but aim
at developing into responsible individuals that are sensitive to their environment, sharing the worries of their community and making a contribution to the society.

Adopting the principle of “Non scholae, sed vitae discimus” (We do not learn for the school, but for life), İstanbul Bilgi University took its place within the Turkish system of higher education as a civil corporation after the application made by the Bilgi Education and Culture Foundation on 7 June 1996 and the subsequent approval by the Turkish Grand National Assembly according to Law number 4142.

Over time, İstanbul Bilgi University has grown to encompass 3 main campuses, Kuştepe, Dolapdere and Santral, that total 160,000 square meters and it is on these three campuses that it continues to serve its students and the academic world in Turkey.

Having realized many firsts in its 15 years and with the aim of increasing the quality of education and research and becoming a university that can compete globally, İstanbul Bilgi University began a long term partnership with Laureate Education, one of the largest international education networks in the world, in 2006 and continues to be a part of this network.

The university currently has around 11,000 students, 600 academic staff members, 6 faculties, 4 institutes, 4 schools, and 7 programs associated with its vocational schools, and around 100 programs that provide education to its associate, undergraduate and graduate students. As of 2014, a total of over 14,000 students have graduated from the university.

For more information, please visit the university website [http://www.bilgi.edu.tr]